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I. Introduction1 
Based on the theory of  status coined by Georg Jellinek and his most relevant 
updates, this article intends to develop the notion of  status activus digitalis as a fundamental 
legal condition of  the individual in times of  digital democracy. Although with different 
foundations and characteristics – which will not be the subject of  further analysis 
here – it is possible to say that the participation of  citizens (status activus  processualis, 
as confirmed conformed by Häberle) appears as a central element of  theories of  
democracy, a context in which access to information plays a strategic role. In this 
scenario, the digital environment enhances this participation (status activus digtialis), 
but the occurrence of  fake news affects this information and, consequently, the public 
debate, representing a real (not fake!) threat to democracy. Thus, the theory of  the 
status of  Jellinek will be approached first. Then, Häberle’s notion of  status activus 
processualism - that gives base to the notion of  status activus digitalis proposed here – 
will be developed. Finally, the phenomenon of  fake news and its repercussions for the 
exercise of  status activus and for democracy will be analyzed.
 
II. Status activus digitalis: foundations based on Georg Jellinek’s 
theory of  status
In his work entitled “System der subjektiven öffentlichen Rechten” (published in 1892), 
Georg Jellinek develops the idea that the individual has different status in his relationship 
with the State; this status has, in turn, a close relation to fundamental rights, but cannot 
be identified with them because, in his view, the extension of  personality is variable and 
can be enlarged or diminished in face of  the rights assigned to it.2
In his relationship with the State,3 the individual finds himself  in different 
“status” or positions, being the “status theory”, therefore, an attempt to categorize 
these relations: a) status subjectionis (corresponds to a passive status, in which the 
individual does not belong to any legal order and therefore is deprived of  rights and 
obligations, being submitted to the State);4 b) status negativus (linked to negative rights, 
allowing the individual a sphere of  freedom towards the State – this is, for Jellinek, the 
fundamental status, corresponding to a prerogative of  nonintervention of  the State - 
1 This article is a result of  a research project sponsored by CNPq (Universal Call - Case 403533/2018-0 
and Research Productivity Grant - Case 306417/2018 - 9). The research is developed at the “Integrated 
Center for Studies and Research in Public Policies (CIEPPP)” and at the “Observatory of  Latin American 
Constitutional Jurisdiction” (both funded by FINEP and linked to the Master and PhD Program in 
Law, UNISC). It also is part of  the international cooperation project “Observatory of  Latin American 
Constitutional Jurisdiction”, financed by Capes PGCI 02/2015 - Process 88881.1375114 / 2017-1 and 
Process 88887.137513 / 2017-00). 
2 Georg Jellinek, Systen der subjektiven öffentlichen Rechte, 2. Auflage [Tübingen: Lizenzausgabe mit 
freundlicher Genehmigung des Verlags J. C. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1919].
3 Jellinek’s theory was developed at the end of  the 19th century, taking as a reference a concept based on 
the notion of  Modern State, so that it needs to be updated in a context identified by the transformations 
and normative plurality to which the States are subjected today [Matthias Jestaed, “Selbstand und 
Offenheit der Verfassung gegenüber nationalem, supranationalem und internationalem Recht”, in 
Handbuch des Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Band XII, Hrsg. v. J. Isensee u. P. Kirchhof  
(Heidelberg: C.F. Müller, 2014), 327].
4 According to some authors [Stephan Kirste, “Individualism and collectivism in the foundation of  
group rights”, in Fundamental rights: justification and interpretation, eds. Kenneth Einar Himmah and Bojan 
Spaic (Amsterdam: Eleven International Publishing, 2018)], this status would have ceased to exist with 
the “Universal Declaration of  Human Rights”, which, in its Article 6, states that “Everyone has the right to 
recognition everywhere as a person before the law.”
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freedom);5 c) status positivus (associated with positive rights, provided to the citizen by the 
State;6 d) status activus (linked to active or “participation rights”, being identified, from 
the perspective of  the author, with political rights – according to him, it corresponds 
to the “status of  citizenship”).
In spite of  the current relevance and adequacy of  these concepts in the present, 
some updates of  this theory have been proposed over the last years, trying to 
incorporate to it the complexity and the perceived advances in a scenario characterized 
by transformations in the conformation of  the State and its relations.
Along these lines, one of  the most widespread proposals was developed by the 
German jurist Winfried Brugger,7 whose design incorporates the figure of  the status 




Problem to be solved Solution to the problem Prominently 
analyzed by
1. Sovereignty: individual 
subject to the full power 
of  government - status 
subjectionis.
Anarchy, war, rupture of  
political or religious power.
National unity, absolute 




2. Freedom: individual with 
status libertatis, negativus in 
the face of  state power.
Aggregation of  state 
power, usurpation 
of  powers, resulting 
in the exploitation 
and super -regulation of  
individuals in society.
Separation of  powers, 
constitutional rights against 
powers, federalism, separation 





3. Democracy: Individuals 
legitimize power through 
status activus.
Aggregation of  state 
power, usurpation of  
powers, resulting in political 
incapacitation.
Rights of  freedom 
of  expression and of  
communication (manifestation 
of  thought, meeting, 
association), right to vote, 





4. Social State: individuals 
subsidized by the State in 
status positivus.
Government indifference 
to the needs of  the 
population, resulting in the 
poverty of  the weak and 
oppressed.
Social Welfare or the principle 
of  social justice, incorporation 




5. Transnationality I: 
individuals organized 
among themselves in the 
status europaeus. II: individuals 
organized among themselves 
in the “status universalis”.
Existence of  very strong/
weak national States in 
Europe, indifference.
Integration of  National 
States in the European 






5 “Das Individuum soll vom Staate zu keiner gesetzeswidrigen Leistung herangezogen werden und hat demnach einen auf  
Anerkennung seiner Freiheit basierten Anspruch auf  Unterlassung und Aufhebung der diese Norm überschreitenden 
obrigkeitlichen Befehle” Jellinek, Systen der subjektiven öffentlichen Rechte.
6 “Der Einzelne erhält die rechtlich geschützte Fähigkeit, positive Leistungen vom Staat zu verlangen und für den 
Staat die rechtliche Verpflichtung, im Einzelinteresse tätig zu werden” (Jellinek, Systen der subjektiven öffentlichen 
Rechte). It should be noted, however, that in Jellinek‘s perspective, those benefits do not correspond 
to a common interest or to a general welfare concept, since they are conceived as “reflex rights” 
(Reflexrechte) of  the duty of  the State; thus, the author recognizes only an individual right to benefits 
(Jellinek, Systen der subjektiven öffentlichen Rechte).
7 Winfried Brugger, “Georg Jellineks Statuslehre: national und international. Eine Würdigung und 
Aktualisierung anläßlich seines 100. Todestages im Jahr 2011”, in Integration, Kommunikation und Konfrontation 
in Recht und Staat. Gesammelte Aufsätze. Hrsg. v. Stephan Kirste u. Helen Brugger (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 
2013) advanced in this development, incorporating new status: the status oecologicus and the status culturalis.
8 Winfried Brugger and Mônia Clarissa Hennig Leal, “Os direitos fundamentais nas modernas 
Constituições: uma abordagem comparativa entre o constitucionalismo alemão e brasileiro a partir da 
teoria dos status de Jellinek”, Revista do Direito, v. 28 (2007).
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 According to the author, although this summary of  the most important stages of  
modern constitutionalism was formulated for the first time in 1892, its development 
and updating comprises the entire history of  the risks and opportunities represented 
by the State, not being restricted or applying to a single country or reality only.
1. Status sujbjectionis: recognizing State unlimited sovereign powers produces 
stabilization in times of  anarchy and war.
2. Status negativus: once the problem of  anarchy and war is solved, other “basic 
problems” concerning the notion of  sovereignty can take place. Unlimited political 
power can overlap, exploit, and discriminate parts of  the population – hence why it 
is necessary to advance, in terms of  State organization, to the next stage (2). It has to 
incorporate the principle of  freedom, which leads to negative rights, a status in which 
citizens of  a State can self-determine how they want to live their lives and develop 
their personality. Freedom means having the possibility of  choice, implying the right 
to choose in several of  the most important areas of  life: choosing a profession, a 
marriage partner, a political party, a church, religion, etc. And choosing on the basis of  
freedom also presupposes two more elements: choosing means that there are several 
other options (not just one partner, group or church, but several); in addition, the 
right to choose also presupposes that one has the right to choose (the profession, the 
party, the partner, in which to believe, etc.) without, however, being compelled to do 
so. In other words, every right to freedom has at the same time an active and a passive 
aspect. Hence why is it not conceived as possible for a modern State to compel its 
citizens to choose a particular profession, church, religion or political party. On the 
other hand, however, it may expect his citizens to work for their own subsistence or to 
take part in the elections.
3. Status activus: if  the right of  representation of  the interests of  all is presented 
as the central question of  constitutionalism, then the guarantee of  political freedom 
presupposes more than not being subjugated by government. This means that 
government bodies themselves must be established on the basis of  the free will of  
the people. This is the core of  the democratic principle as an element of  organization 
of  internal power, supplemented by the right to vote of  each citizen and freedom of  
expression of  thought, which allows the citizen to form informed opinions about how 
to regulate public affairs, aspect that leads us to stage three (3) of  our picture about the 
legitimacy of  the Constitution9. 
4. Status positivus: at this point, legitimate representation of  every citizen of  a State 
needs to be fortified. Not every member of  society is capable of  competing on equal 
terms and effectively having a good life. There are young and old, as well as sick, 
for example, too weak to compete. There may also be groups of  people traditionally 
disadvantaged in their life chances by virtue of  their ethnic ancestry, the color of  
their skin or even their religion. If  these people have to submit to and accept what 
the democratic majority decides – without promoting revenge or massacres – then 
they should be given a chance not only to achieve political representation, but also to 
have their financial, social and cultural interests considered and protected. That’s why 
9 It is possible to say that a juridical order characterized by the guarantee of  negative fundamental 
rights and by the corresponding guarantee of  separation of  Powers, as well as by the protection of  the 
rights of  democratic participation, not recognizing social rights, configures what could be designated 
as a “formal” or “minimal” Constitutional State. This is the model adopted in the United States, while 
most other modern Constitutions incorporate aspects, especially with regard to social and cultural 
rights. These Constitutions are often referred to as “material” or as “value” Constitutions [Peter 
Häberle, Verfassungslehre als Kulturwisseschaft, 2. Auflage (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1998), 368].
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stage four (4) integrates most of  the Constitutions, either explicitly or implicitly. It 
implies a fair distribution, or, if  necessary, redistribution of  social and natural assets, 
in order to protect the young, the old, the weak, and the disadvantaged sections of  the 
population. It is clear that the principle of  social welfare does not replace the general 
duty that each person should be able to work and take care of  herself  and family. State 
protection here is merely subsidiary10 in order to guarantee minimum standards of  
existence for all individuals and groups.
5 Status europaeus: the legitimate representation of  the interests of  the population 
finally requires, at this stage (5), an opening of  the internal governmental structure to 
consensus and international law. Empirically, every State (be it old or new, powerful 
or weak), to some extent, depends on other countries, neighbors or not, for security, 
economy and culture. But there are also normative issues that point to a need to observe 
and take into account supranational aspects. If, empirically, a country is dependent on 
others and becomes stronger having partners, then coordination of  matters such as 
security, economics, and commerce requires the establishment of  supranational and 
international standards of  conduct. In the same vein, if  a country intends to demonstrate 
to its population that its actions are legitimate and deserve to be accepted peacefully by 
all the recipients, then consideration regarding the standards of  the other communities 
becomes necessary.11 That is why, after World War II, Europe and the world community 
engaged in the development of  a comprehensive regime of  international human rights 
treaties, as a way to complement and strengthen the constitutional rights of  internal 
order. Europe has even developed institutional supplementation with respect to 
National States in establishing the European Union. As a result, there are, in Europe, 
in addition to the internal constitution of  each State, two levels of  legal integration.12 
In most Western States, the main function of  human and fundamental rights 
is “negative”, which means that these rights are directed against possible abuses of  
power, against tyranny and against absolute sovereignty, imposing limits on power and 
governments. The ground that justifies the adoption of  such a strategy lies in historical 
experience itself, which demonstrates that “power corrupts” and that “absolute power 
corrupts absolutely”. This aspect is covered in stages one and two of  the schematic 
picture concerning the evolution of  the modern state outlined above. As human and 
fundamental rights attest, these rights are first seen as “rights of  freedom” or “freedom 
from”, especially governmental interference or coercion. In this sense, all organizations 
and organs of  State power, whether horizontal (separation of  Powers in Legislative, 
Executive and Judiciary), or vertical (federalism, different levels of  organization and 
linkage – from the transnational spheres, through the national to the local scope) serve 
10 The notion of  positive social rights, proper to social constitutionalism [Mônia Clarissa Hennig 
Leal, Jurisdição Constitucional aberta: reflexões sobre os limites e a legitimidade da jurisdição constitucional na ordem 
democrática (Rio de Janeiro: Lumen Juris, 2007), 27] is incorporated here.
11 Here comparative law and comparative constitutional law in particular gain prominence. This branch 
of  science allows people and its rulers to visualize what solutions have been and are given to certain 
social and political problems in other countries. That’s why Peter Häberle considers comparative 
constitutional law as “the fifth method of  interpretation” [Peter Häberle, “Grundrechtsgeltung 
und Grundrechtsinterpretation im Verfassungsstaat. Zugleich zur Rechtsvergleichung als “fünfter” 
Auslegungsmethode“, in Rechtsvergleichung im Kraftfeld des Verfassungsstaates (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 
1992)]; according to him, this method naturally does not have a binding force (binding authority), but 
it can play a persuasive authority.
12 That allows to understand why all books and German Manuals of  Constitutional Law contain a 
chapter on “State Theory” dedicated to work out this integration [Jörn Ipsen, Staatsrecht I, 17. Auflage 
(München: Luchterhand, 2005)].
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one and the same purpose: to prevent tyranny and, at the same time, to enable the 
coordination of  State Powers to achieve legitimate purposes. As important as this 
function is, however, it is not – and could not be – the only one, as the evolution 
of  modern constitutionalism demonstrates. Keeping government away from people, 
setting limits and legal barriers to their interference in the rights of  each individual 
does not seem enough to legitimize it; it must also become an instrument of  the 
people themselves, which is democratic: a “government of, for and for the people”, 
as the maxim immortalized by Abraham Lincoln preaches. The government must also 
guarantee rights to weak, poor and/or discriminated individuals or groups. That is why 
many Constitutions in Eastern European and Latin American countries have developed 
“positive” functions for human and fundamental rights, in addition to the specific 
social rights contained in their texts.13 These rights, in fact, remain “negative” (that is, 
they act as a counterpoint and as a limit to State power); but now they also incorporate 
a “positive” dimension, so that each person or individual can claim to see realized 
and make use of  those same rights.14 The purely formal right to defend property or 
inviolability of  the home, for example, is not of  great value to those who do not own 
a property or a house. This is why, as the principle of  social welfare demonstrates at a 
structural level, the defensive function of  fundamental rights must be supplemented 
by a “positive” dimension.15 
All these aspects, were fundamental in the conformation and consolidation of  
the Rule of  Law, in its different variables. Nowadays, however, in face of  the “digital 
revolution”, the possibility (and – why not say – necessity) of  developing a new category, 
identified with a status digitalis, can be seen to explain the condition of  individuals and 
their rights in the context of  a highly connected world, in which the space of  life is 
transferred from the real to the virtual.
Before proceeding in this direction however, we will next address the theoretical 
construction of  Peter Häberle on the notion of  status activus processualis (parting from 
the notion of  status activus developed by Jellinek), seeking to link it to the challenges 
of  democracy and realization of  fundamental rights, and as central element of  
participation in public affairs.
 
III. Status activus digitalis: advancing in Häberle’s 
status activus processualis as central concept of  democracy 
Formulating the bases for reflection on fundamental social rights and fundamental 
rights in the context of  the Welfare State (Leistungsstaat ), Häberle parts from the 
13 As mentioned earlier in this article, this is the point where the American Constitution distances itself  
from many other modern Constitutions: the former is restricted to securing aspects of  democratic 
organization and power limitation, whereas the latter are characterized by advancing in these aspects 
and incorporating new contents.
14 The philosophical foundation of  this conception can be found in the work of  John Rawls, according 
to whom the “right to freedom” and the “value of  freedom” cannot be dissociated [John Rawls, A 
theory of  justice (New York: Ithaca, 1974)].
15 This process can, in turn, take place in different ways. In Germany, for example, the step to add 
a positive aspect (financial, organizational, structural and interpretative) to the negative aspect of  
freedom rights was given by the Constitutional Court, which “invented” these additional functions by 
developing its case law, in the beginning of  the 50’s. Since then, Jellinek’s “status positivus” can be found 
in two distinct places in the German Basic Law: in the broad spectrum of  rights and in the doctrinal 
aspects developed to support them [Winfried Brugger, “Konkretisierung des Rechts und Auslegung der 
Gesetze”, in Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts (AöR), Band 119 (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1994)].
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premise that the – strictly – legal technique, characteristic of  the liberal State, is no 
longer sufficient to account the new demands represented by the positive dimension 
attributed to those rights, characterized as rights to benefits, directed to the State.16
This new reality demands, following the author’s words, a new behavior both on 
the part of  the State and the citizens, and its operability cannot be reduced to mere 
“technicity” (Technizität); thus, participation and procedure need to take the lead, through 
cooperative and communicative forms, because constitutional norms have an open 
character, being endowed with less normative density. Since, however, there is a need 
for maximum realization of  fundamental rights, its implementation – in order to not 
become arbitrary – needs to recognize a new area of   procedural dimension, giving 
impetus to the notion of  status activus processualis developed by Jellinek17 once – due to 
their positive characteristics – they increasingly become the target of  organizational 
and State procedure (weil Grundrechte im Leistungsstaat immer mehr zur Sache staatlicher 
Organisation und Verfahren werden).
Associated with this perspective – their realization and selection of  means 
is variable18 and the object of  necessary weighting and decision – there is also the 
characteristic of  the legislative opening inherent in them, a situation in which it is 
necessary to establish a proportional relationship between the concepts of  legislative 
and procedural elasticity: the more elastic the legislation, the more likely the procedural 
element (must) enter into play. This is why, within a theory of  Social State, the concepts 
of  State and Society must be understood as linked, both of  which must be identified 
with the notion of  res publica.
Thus, a (necessary) relationship of  cooperation between State and Society 
has been put in place, a fact that also presupposes the creation of  new instruments 
and mechanisms of  participation.19 Such a need arises from the perception that the 
(traditional) status subjectionis does not – and cannot – configure the main status in the 
context of  a democracy, where the relation citizen-State is developed in a communicative 
and cooperative dimension.20
In other words, a transformation takes place in the nature of  the realization of  
fundamental rights; the central element of  citizenship is no longer associated with 
the status passivus subjectionis – characterized by a passive dimension21 and protection 
16 Rainer Wahl, “Funktionen der Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit: Schutz vor verfassungswidrigen Recht 
und Beseitigung von Unsicherheit über den Inhalt des Verfassungsrechts”, in Einführung in das öffentliche 
Recht: Verfassung und Verwaltung, Hrsg. Dieter Grimm (Heidelberg: C.F. Müller, 1985), 217.
17 Jellinek, Systen der subjektiven öffentlichen Rechte.
18 Robert Alexy, Theorie der Grundrechte (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1994) faces the question of  the 
possibility of  realizing these rights at different levels when speaking of  principles as “optimization 
duties”. 
19 This new perspective also introduces the creation of  new functional and competence problems, 
once the traditional form of  operationalization reserved for individual negative rights does not appear 
to be sufficient to accomplish this task; this “crisis of  competences” also includes judicial review, 
demanded in new aspects and in new dimensions. 
20 “Obwohl Leistungen auch mit Eingriffen verbunden sein können, ist der ‚status passivus subjectionis‘ nicht 
mehr der Grundstatus in einer freiheitlichen Demokratie. Das Rechtsverhältnis Bürger-Staat ist gekennzeichnet 
durch Kommunikation und Kooperation (statt Subjektion!)” Peter Häberle, Grundrechte im Leistungsstaat. 
Veröffentlichungen der Vereinigung der Deutschen Staatslehrer (VVDStRL), Heft 30. Berichte und 
Diskussionen auf  der Tagung der Vereinigung der Deutschen Staatslehrer in Regensburg vom 29. 
September bis 2. Oktober 1971 (Berlin: Walter Gruyter, 1972), 59. 
21 This observation includes overcoming the typically modern liberal discourse that identifies 
citizenship with passive citizenship, that is, being a citizen means being a subject of  rights and 
duties; it is therefore a civil citizenship, extendable to all individuals indistinctly; active citizenship 
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against interference and State intervention – being transmuted into a markedly active, 
procedural, and participatory dimension.
These new demands also require a restructuring and an opening of  the procedural 
means, an aspect that leads to the need to strengthen, among other democratic aspects, 
publicity22 in a broad sense, and also an effective incorporation of  the interested parties 
and those affected by decisions dependent on political choices or public policies, 
resulting and demanding, therefore, an osmosis between State and Society.
Such reality presupposes, however, for its consolidation, equal chances and 
opportunities of  participation,23 a situation in which the Democratic State must assume 
a special responsibility for the realization of  fundamental rights.24
The status negativus is no longer sufficient to satisfy the demands inherent to this 
new reality. In such a context, the – revisited – notion of  status activus processualis appears 
as the fundamental status of  the democratic State.25 This transformation of  fundamental 
rights does not mean a derogation, but only a transformation, in which, alongside with 
the negative aspect of  non-intervention, there is also a demand for participation.
Therefore, fundamental rights have a triple dimension, whose prominence appears 
as variable: a subjective (defensive), an objective (institutional, where all fundamental 
rights can be considered social rights in a broad sense), and an active (participation, 
procedural).26
(while a traditional notion inherited from Ancient Greece), identified with the right to participate 
in public life, appears to be restricted to a small part of  the population, not constituting its most 
important focus [Franz Wieacker, História do Direito Privado Moderno, trans. Antonio Manoel Botelho 
Hespanha (Lisboa: Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian, 1980)]. The redemption of  a more active 
dimension of  citizenship, surpassing this traditional understanding, strongly reappears in the 
perspective presented here, establishing itself, in Häberle’s view, as an essential pillar. 
22 Although there is no formal mention in this sense and Häberle does not develope theoretically 
the conditions that involve this publicity and this participation, one can perceive here a 
certain approximation to the communicative theory proposed by Jürgen Habermas, Theorie des 
kommunikativen Handelns: Handlungs-rationalität und gesellschaftliche Rationalisierung (Frankfurt a.M.: 
Suhrkamp, 1995). 
23 The aspect of  equal opportunities for participation is recurrent in the discussions that involve 
participation and in the so-called proceduralism. In this sense, it is worth mentioning, as a reference, 
the notion of  “representation reinforcing” sustained by John Hart Ely, Democracy and distrust: a theory 
of  judicial review (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1980) in his classic work 
“Democracy and distrust”, although, there, the accent takes place on the representative aspect, while 
here the notion of  participation is wider and more comprehensive. 
24 The author emphasizes that, at this point, the dogmatics of  fundamental rights gains importance; 
he proposes, thus, the construction of  an “open dogmatics”, capable of  incorporating these 
mutations and the notion of  res publica. Dogmatics and doctrine appear as important instruments 
of  transformation, because they not only reflect change but are also capable of  incorporating them 
into the future - and most of  all – on a rational basis. This task of  dogmatics is facilitated by the 
opening of  the constitutional text itself, since it allows its development (Fortbildung), although the 
author criticizes the use of  this expression, considering it inadequate, since this action takes place 
“intra constitutionem”. 
25 Some theories try to update the Jellinek’s Statuslehre, refounding it and adapting it to the new aspects 
of  reality [Winfried Brugger, Demokratie, Freiheit, Gleichheit: Studien zur Legitimation des Grundgesetzes 
(Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2002)]. 
26 Important to observe that this multiple perspective does not weaken negative rights, such as freedom; 
on the contrary: it leads to their strengthening, once they are seen as essential element for the exercise 
of  the right to participation, inherent to positive rights and to plurality. 
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The status activus is complemented by the negative, positive and passive status,27 which 
implies a re-articulation of  the traditionally existing relationship between them. It is 
a status identified by a highly procedural nature, linked to a right of  participation28 
(Teilhaberecht) – participation in and in the face of  the State.
The right to participate in the democratic State is as essential as the position of  
“citizen” (passive) in the classical Rule of  Law, appearing at the procedural aspect as 
an important element to fortifying the material dimension of  fundamental rights.29 It 
is through the status activus that rights acquire their meaning, which presupposes, first 
and foremost, an informed citizen, that is engaged and takes his fundamental rights 
seriously.
Constitution and fundamental rights constitute a res publica, serving as a program 
and as a substantive reference for the performance of  public tasks.30
Thus, Häberle takes the concept of  status activus (derived from Jellinek’s theory) in 
a broad sense, conceiving participation as an open and pluralistic procedure,31 closely 
related to the idea of  publicity and transparency of  State activities, which includes not 
only availability of  relevant information, but also the access to “trustful”, “clear” and 
“transparent” data (conceived as an individual and as a collective fundamental right).
In a “digital world”, this access to information and participation is (and must be) 
enhanced, conforming what could be called status activus digitalis, opening up space for 
new possibilities, but also for new risks to the protection of  fundamental rights and to 
the exercise of  democracy.
 
IV. Status activus digitalis: participation and disinformation in 
digital democracy
Internet and social networks have become important field in terms of  public 
debate and narrative dispute, widening space for legitimate and factual discussions, but 
also opening ways for dissemination of  fake news. In addition to this fertile environment 
for exchange of  opinions and public debate, the use of  automatic publishing tools 
allowed the emergence and propagation of  BOTs – software controlled accounts that 
act as humans and actively participate in forums related to political facts of  great 
importance.
Robots are used not only to create identification and increase the group of  
followers, but also to conduct attacks on opponents and forge artificial discussions. 
They manipulate debates, create and disseminate false news and influence public 
27 As an example, the author cites the the public subsidy offered to private education, where there is 
an association of  freedom of  education (negative right) and pluralism sought by the Basic Law with 
the social aspect represented by access to education. The same occurs in Brazil, where, increasingly, 
the universalization of  the access to higher education is based on private institutions - through grants 
and financing, for example - more than by free public education. It is, therefore, a right of  freedom 
interpreted socially, which produces a “turnover” (Umschlag) in its classical conception. 
28 In this sense, it should be noted that there are different levels of  participation in fundamental rights, 
and that citizen can appear at different levels at the same time. 
29 Leal, Jurisdição Constitucional aberta. 
30 Here, the constitutionally established right to vote is only a part of  it, so that the development of  
other forms of  participation is necessary; moreover, the right of  participation to which the “status 
activus” refers can be both political and social, once it has a broad spectrum. 
31 Häberle, Grundrechte im Leistungsstaat, 1972, 44-131. Die Verfassung wird damit noch nicht zum 
“juristischen Weltenei”, aus dem alles hervorgeht, sondern wirkligkeitsbezogener Rahmen und 
Sozialprogramm einer “res publica semper reformanda”, Substanz von Aufgaben (Häberle, Grundrechte im 
Leistungsstaat, 1972, 99). 
® UNIO - EU LAW JOURNAL Vol. 5, No. 2, July 2019
72 Mônia Clarissa Hennig Leal
opinion, posting and replicating messages on a large scale; also promote hashtags that 
gain prominence with the massification of  automated postings, in order to stifle 
spontaneous debate.
With this kind of  manipulation, robots create a false sense of  broad political 
support for a particular proposal, idea or public figure, modifying the direction of  
public policies, interfering with the stock market, spreading rumors, fake news and 
conspiracy theories, and generating misinformation and pollution content.
Parties and other social movements also make use of  this tool to engage voters, 
as well as to attack opponents and guide discussions around their interests, using even 
robot networks (botnets) orchestrated to generate a strong interference in public opinion, 
by manipulating trending topics32 and directing the public debate in general.
This action, which relies on the sharing of  links as a means of  propagation, 
tries, at the other hand, to avoid or reduce the weight of  the debate on a certain 
subject. Therefore, robots generate a huge amounts of  information that reach users 
simultaneously to real and relevant information, which end up having their impact 
diminished or underestimated. So, the use of  robots not only disseminates fake news, 
with harmful effects on society, but also actively seeks to prevent users from informing 
themselves adequately.33
The growth of  concerted action of  robots represents a real threat to the public 
debate, presenting  risks to democracy, by manipulating the formation of  consensuses 
in the public arena and interfering directly in the selection of  representatives – and by 
means of  consequence – in the government agenda responsible for defining the future 
of  the country.34
Another phenomenon that contributes to the expansion of  fake news is how 
it is disseminated. Research shows that people tend to interact on social networks 
with others who share the same thoughts, living in a “bubble” where the circulating 
information reinforces the same beliefs and opinions (homophilia).
In a political environment characterized by polarization, rather than admitting the 
presence of  different or conflicting opinions and plurality as something positive, the 
individual search for elements to reaffirm one’s own particular concepts usually tends 
to incriminate and blame the group at the opposite spectrum for all existing ills.35
In this line, the performance of  robots is, again, strategic, once bots are based 
on algorithms, they allow people of  each “bubble” to obtain only the information 
they want to receive. According to Fernández García, “Google crawls between more than 
57 variables (for example, computer brand from which it is accessed, location, software used, etc.) to 
determine the search results that will be most relevant to each person. Facebook also tracks between the 
clicks of  their users what they share and the contacts they interact with, as well as information about 
the electronic devices they access, information about purchases and transactions within Facebook services 
32 According to the author, this kind of  actions has been identified in major international politic events, 
such as the 2010 American elections, Donald Trump’s election in 2016 and the UK referendum related 
to the European Union (Brexit). In Brazil, the dispute for Presidency in 2014 was characterized by 
a growing political upheaval, coming the robots to motivate about 11% of  the discussions [Marco 
Aurélio Ruediger, Robôs, redes sociais e política no Brasil: estudo sobre interferências ilegítimas no debate público na 
web, riscos à democracia e processo eleitoral de 2018 (Rio de Janeiro: FGV, DAPP, 2017), 17]. 
33 Ruediger, Robôs, redes sociais e política no Brasil, 10. 
34 Ruediger, Robôs, redes sociais e política no Brasil, 7. 
35 Renê Morais da Costa Braga, “A indústria das fake news e o discurso de ódio”, in Direitos políticos, 
liberdade de expressão e discurso de ódio, vol. I, org. Rodolfo Viana Pereira (Belo Horizonte: IDDE, 2018), 
210, https://goo.gl/xmUwkd. 
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or information provided by company partners. With all this data, customize the content that shows 
each user”.36
In this context, citizens end up consuming news that are adjusted to their way of  
thinking, making it difficult to create a pluralistic sphere of  dialogue, one of  the central 
aspects of  some of  the most important theories of  democracy nowadays. Democratic 
information and participation are vitiated, putting at risk precisely the bases on which 
these conceptions of  democracy were developed.
It is important, however, to bear in mind that the use of  false news to influence 
electoral processes always existed. What aggravates this situation in terms of  prevalence 
of  digital communication technologies, is the possibility of  that content to become 
viral, by the use of  algorithms in social networks.37
This process operates what is usually called “post-truth”: “It was in 2003. Lying 
headlines – oriented, tolerated or induced by the Pentagon – realized that Iraqi dictator Saddam 
Hussein was manufacturing chemical weapons of  mass destruction. Reputable, high-profile newspapers 
highlighted this story, which helped convince public opinion that the decision to send US-led troops was 
well-received with the enthusiastic support of  Tony Blair, the British prime minister, invading Iraq. 
Years later, George W. Bush and Tony Blair admitted that the charge was a fraud, but the damage 
was already done. A survey released in late 2016 showed that 53 percent of  Americans still believed 
that the allegation that Iraq was producing chemical weapons of  mass destruction was authentic”.38
It is clear that the use of  this kind of  tool that personalizes news and other 
contents by Facebook and Twitter, in addition to search engines (like Google, for 
example), accelerates and reinforces the “post-truth” phenomenon.39
Moreover, as Oliver40 argues, networks are unable to discriminate between real 
and false news (especially because the criteria of  journalism or source-checking do not 
apply to them); in the same way, neither are users able to make this distinction, thus 
enhancing, once again, the “post-truth”.
 
V. Conclusion
Considering all the elements exposed above, it is possible to conclude, that, 
paradoxically, at the same time that social networks allow a great mobilization and 
36 Nuria Fernández-García, “Fake News: una oportunidad para la alfabetización mediática”, Nueva 
Sociedad, No. 269 (mayo-junio, 2017): 68, www.nuso.org. 
37 Viviane Machado and Hosana Oliveira Duarte, “Fake news nas eleições: ponderações entre a liberdade 
de informação e o excesso midiático”, Interdisciplinary Scientific Journal, No. 4, volume 5, article No. 10 
(October/December, 2018): 11, D.O.I: http://dx.doi.org/10.17115/2358-8411/v5n4a10. According to 
data presented by the author, in the case of  the murder of  Marielle Franco, in Rio de Janeiro, less than 
48 hours after the crime, rumors were published on social networks about her alleged involvement with 
traffickers. A study by the Public Policy Analysis Board of  the Getúlio Vargas Foundation (FGV DAPP) 
showed that the repercussion of  the case motivated 2.1 million posts on Twitter and that the viralization 
of  the factoid parted from one single post (Machado and Oliveira Duarte, “Fake news nas eleições”, 10). 
38 Eugenio Bucci, “Pós-política e corrosão da verdade”, Revista USP, No. 116 (january/february/
march, 2018): 24.  
39 According to some researches, several of  the false reports that influenced the US presidential campaign 
on the occasion of  Donald Trump’s election came from sites registered in a small Macedonian city called 
Veles (Braga, “A indústria das fake news e o discurso de ódio”, 207-208). What’s more, even though only 
14% of  Americans report that social media was their main source of  information in the three months 
prior to vote, Trump-friendly fake news were shared 30 million times on Facebook, while Clinton’s 
Clinton were shared only 8 million times [S. Enguix Oliver, “Impacto político e informativo de las redes 
sociales: esferas de actuación y comparación con los médios”, Anàlisi. Quaderns de Comunicació i Cultura, 
56 (June, 2017): 71-85, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5565/rev/analisi.3090]. 
40 Enguix Oliver, “Impacto político e informativo de las redes sociales”, 77. 
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circulation of  content, allowing citizens to have a wide access to information – so 
that he/she can exercise its condition of  status activus digitalis (understood as Häberle’s 
status activus processualis in a digital perspective), they put this concept at risk precisely 
because they could vitiate the public debate, as well as – considering the strategies 
and manipulations evidenced in the text – compromise the plurality inherent in the 
democratic environment.
“Digital citizenship” is, therefore, both a blessing and a pest that devastates 
democracy, and one cannot wait for a swift resolution to this conundrum. It is 
necessary not only for digital education and normative regulation, but also an effort of  
citizenship itself, by exercising the status activus digitalis with compromise and pluralistic 
and critical spirits.
